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ABSTRACT
This study examined empirically the impact of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) succession on the financial performance of firms listed on the Nigerian 
stock exchange. For the purpose of this research, secondary data was used and the instruments of data collection were financial statements. A matched-
paired t-test was used in testing the hypothesis. The overall results show that using return on asset, return on equity, return on capital employed and 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance; companies that experienced forced CEO turnovers had disrupted performances and therefore experienced 
decreased performance following CEO succession. The results also show a significant decline in the performance of companies that had insider 
successors. However, the study found increase performance in firms where the CEO voluntarily resigns and an outsider took over as the CEO. As 
CEO succession has a significant impact on subsequent performance of Nigerian firms, this study therefore recommends that board should have 
well-structured succession plans that would define what exactly is the goal of the firms and the type of successor required to fit in. In addition the 
apparent successors should be assessed based on the proficiencies needed to achieve high financial and organizational performance and the capabilities 
and profile necessary to undertake the role of the CEO should be properly defined. This should include a narrative explanation of the required skill, 
competencies, attitudes, knowledge and other important abilities required for a standard performance.
Keywords: Chief Executive Officer Succession, Financial Performance, Nigerian Stock Exchange, Firms and Competencies 
JEL Classifications: E44, G1
1. INTRODUCTION
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (hereafter refers to as CEOs) 
succession events are considered to be very vital occurrences in 
the corporate life which as a result determines the performance 
or otherwise of a business enterprise. It is of utmost importance 
because the going concern of the business relies significantly 
on who succeeds the CEO. CEO succession makes available an 
avenue for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of a leader 
in determining a firms’ wealth. Davidson et al. (2006) identified 
leadership as being an important component of a successful 
corporate governance mechanism, which can improve the 
performance of a firm.
The CEO is the individual saddled with the responsibility of setting 
organizational plans, goals, objectives, organizational structures 
and performances. As a result of this, the central concept and 
framework of the business in any organizational setting emanates 
from the CEO. An interesting view was expressed by Dalton and 
Kesner (1985) that “many financial periodicals, including Business 
Week, Forbes, Fortune and the Wall Street Journal, confirms that 
experts agree that CEOs will be the individuals responsible and 
to blame for setting organisational technique, structure, setting 
and efficiency and because CEOs considerably influence their 
particular organisations, any changes from the CEO situation 
will considerably affect investors” perceptions, thus affecting the 
longer term of this firm.
Due to the importance of these highly ranked managerial positions, 
a top management change represents a major event in the history 
of any company Costa 2013.
Therefore, the replacement of such a manager is of extreme 
importance and has its effects on the going concern of the organization. 
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As noted by Morten et al. (2012), CEOs have an economically and 
statistically large effect on profitability, revenue, and investment 
outcomes. Firms underperform when their chief executives are 
hospitalized but otherwise exhibit similar performance relative to 
other firms. The results of an investigation carried out by Morten et al. 
(2012) indicated that a 10 days hospital stay reduces firm operating 
profitability by 4%. In the words of Rhim et al. (2006), it was posited 
that top executives with leadership roles largely influences the firm’s 
strategy, design, performance and corporate culture.
However, Dauda (2013) posited that the biggest challenge for most 
organizations in Nigeria is how to effect a well-designed change 
of leadership without disrupting the organizational continuity. 
The transition from one CEO to another is a critical moment in 
a company’s history because a smooth transition is essential to 
maintain the confidence of investors, business partners, customer 
and employees, and provides the incoming CEO with a solid 
platform from which to move the company forward (Russell, 2014).
Prior studies have revealed mixed findings about the impact 
of CEO, management, and leadership successions in firms 
pursuing high performance. Most of the studies have centred on 
the developed countries but none to the best of the researchers’ 
have considered how CEOs succession impact on the financial 
performance of listed firms in Nigeria. Therefore, the focal point 
of this research is therefore to investigate the manner, in which 
CEO succession affects the financial performance of selected 
listed firms in Nigeria. In addition, this paper would also attempt 
to examine whether the nature of the CEO’s turnover or the origin 
of the CEO can be connected to the post-succession financial 
performance of the firms listed in the Nigeria stock exchange 
(NSE). The major objectives of this paper is to determine how 
outsider successor; inside successor; forced CEO turnover and 
voluntary CEO turnover affect the post-succession financial 
performs of listed firms in Nigeria.
The rest of the paper is divided into 5 parts. The 2nd part looked 
at the literatures and hypotheses development and third section 
discussed the research methods part 4 discusses the analysis 
and implications of findings while part 5 is the conclusion and 
recommendations.
However, for the purpose of achieving the above state objectives, 
the following hypotheses have been stated in the null:
H
0
: A forced CEO turnover does not negatively affect the post-
succession financial performance of firms in Nigeria.
H
0
: There is no significant impact of insider succession on firms’ 
post-succession financial performance.
H
0
: Voluntary CEO Turnover does not affect the post-succession 
financial performance of firms in Nigeria.
H
0
: There is no significant impact of outsider succession on firms 
post-succession financial performance.
2. LITERATURE REVIEWS
2.1. CEO Succession
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the planning process for 
an executive officers’ succession has become a vital issue in the 
area of corporate governance ever. This act ensured that, in the 
event of having difficulty with one employee, the company will not 
have a threatened going concern and will remain fully functional. 
This creates tremendous value for shareholders. The concept of 
CEO succession has been described in various ways by different 
bodies and organisations.
In Nigeria, there is no uniform definition to the concept of CEO 
succession. CEO succession can be identified as the process by 
which a corporate board ensures that its organization is able 
to maintain sustenance of excellence in CEO leadership over 
time, with changes from one leader to the next. According to 
Animashaun and Oyeneyin (2002), succession in legal terminology 
is the passing of property to persons upon the death of the owner 
of the property.
In organizational theory, succession is the process of transferring 
management control from one generation of leaders to the next 
generation including the dynamics before, during and after the 
actual transition as cited by Shepherd and Zacharakis, (2000). 
Nigeria has witnessed different forms of CEO succession. While 
many have increased the performance of the firms in term of 
profitability, brands, goodwill and productivity level, many have 
eroded what the company initially stood for and shareholders’ 
wealth. The dynamics of CEO succession globally and especially 
in Nigeria comes with its intrigues and politics which necessitate 
an empirical review now that many firms (as a result of global 
liquidity) are either merging or acquiring one another and how 
this can improve the wealth of the owners and the value it create.
2.2. CEO Succession and Post-succession Financial 
Performance
In a research carried out by Ishak et al. (2013), the examination 
indicates that on average, the post-succession performance of firms 
improves to some extent after the occurrence of CEO succession. 
This position was supported by Graffin et al. (2011) that succession 
happens when an organization or a firm makes a declaration 
concerning the appointment of a new CEO. Also, Helfat and 
Bailey (2005) recommended that members of the board expect 
that a newly appointed leader will make changes and will impose a 
mandate for improving the organization’s policies. In other words, 
they assume that a newly elected CEO would establish policies 
and schemes that will improve the post-succession performance 
of the organization.
For example, Chaimahawong and Sakulsriprasert (2013) in their 
finding which was aimed at examining the important factors 
that affects the succession processes in businesses and the post 
succession era of Thai family firms, recognises several stages of 
effects and categorize them into four factors. The factors include: 
The financial factors, the context factors, the personal factor 
and the intra-family relationship factor. The structural equation 
model was used to evaluate the grades of impacts these factors 
have on the succession process of Thai family firms. According 
to Chaimahawong and Sakulsriprasert (2013), the outcome of the 
research work, indicated that the relationship between succession 
process and the post-succession performance is positive and 
affects post succession performance at a very high degree. What 
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this means is that, the better the succession process, the better the 
post-succession performance and vice versa.
According to Banning (2013), companies often discharge their 
CEOs when the financial performance of the company weakens. 
The research was focused on evaluating the reason CEO 
replacement affects the financial performance of firms. They also 
maintained that new CEO’s have the potential of initiating highly 
favourable negotiations on contracts with high benefits.
2.3. Outsider Successors and Post-succession Financial 
Performance
Chung and Luo, (2012) in a recent research paper evaluated the 
impact leadership succession has on the performance of firms in 
economies that are emerging. Their argument is based on the origin 
of the successor and firms performance. The researchers according 
to their findings suggested that outside successors improves the 
firm’s profitability due to the fast growing changes and large scale 
in the developing markets. Nonetheless, the outsider efficiency is 
minimized in family owned businesses but in non-family owned 
businesses, outsider successors are amplified because the ways 
in which the outsider successor facilitates resource acquisition is 
perceived by many to be legitimate. This study was supported by 
evaluating Taiwanese listed firms between 1996 and 2005.
This was corroborated by Mooney et al. (2014) that when 
considering the replacement of a CEO, the board of directors 
seek for knowledgeable and upright personalities to front-run 
organizations over a long period of time.
2.4. Insider Successors and Post-succession Financial 
Performance
The succession of a leader is a central event in the life of any 
business organization. What this view tries to buttress is that the 
new manager would have significant impact on firm performance 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The selection of an internal 
successor capitalizes on the significance of continuity. According 
to Chung et al. (1987), insiders possess great knowledge of the firm 
and their established social networks. The existence of an internal 
candidate provide for smooth transition stability due to the fact that 
they are well informed and have taken part in the development of 
corporate strategies. Employees also have a sense of commitment 
when there is an avenue for staff rising up the ranks to attain top 
management positions.
2.5. Forced CEO Turnover and Post-succession 
Financial Performance
On the basis of turnover type, Ishak et al. (2013) on CEO 
succession, find that in scenarios involving forced turnovers 
(FTOs), the individual chosen to succeed the CEO is most likely 
to be an outsider and in cases of voluntary turnovers (VTOs), 
insiders are more likely to be chosen as successors. In the words 
of Weisbach (1988), a forced CEO turnover can be defined 
as a turnover that results from reasons other than customary 
retirements. On the other hand, recognizing FTOs is troublesome 
since openly accessible sources don’t recognize them accordingly. 
Hence, former poor performance is taken as an intermediary that 
triggers a forced CEO turnover.
For the most part, forced CEO turnovers are isolated into two 
sorts. It includes: CEO-initiated turnover and board initiated 
turnover. According to Furtado and Karan (1990), markets react 
differently to turnovers initiated by company boards compared to 
turnovers initiated by CEO’s. In the event that the board launches 
the evacuation of the CEO, it is officeholder on the board as it 
arranges the evacuation of the CEO to plan for the arrangement 
of the acting CEO. For coherence purpose, the arrangement of the 
Acting CEO ought to be synchronized with the declaration of the 
evacuation of a CEO.
2.6. Voluntary CEO Turnover and Post-succession 
Financial Performance
According to Maury, (2006), VTO can be defined as the change 
of CEO that occurs as a result of retirement between the age of 
54 and 55, loss of life or illness, or the CEO replacement which 
occurs due to mergers and takeovers. VTO is usually a planned 
occurrence and therefore has no significant effect on the share price 
movement of a firm. A very good illustration of a planned CEO 
change is the accustomed retirement whereby an announcement is 
made by the CEO regarding his intention to retire at a future date. 
As the change is foreseen, the successor has of now been decided 
and prepped inside the firm.
According to Rhim et al. (2006), since the market is mindful of the 
foreseen substitution of the CEO, it does not essentially respond to 
the declaration of the approaching CEO. Denis and Denis (1995) 
however demonstrate that ordinary retirement is not identified 
with lower execution preceding administration change and that a 
little change in execution generally takes after such a succession. 
Salas (2010) nonetheless discovers that the stock value response 
is firmly positive if the senior official’s residency surpasses 
10 years, a marker of administrative entrenchment. In the occasion 
of a voluntary flight, the CEO will make an announcement of his 
intention before a consequent take-off. Normally, a deliberate 
take-off does not give sufficient lead time to the quest for a 
lasting substitution to be finished in time before the flight of the 
officeholder. Unless the intentional flight emerges on the event of 
a retirement, an acting CEO is normally presupposed amid such 
moves. In this condition, the Board would have sufficient time 
to meet to consider the arrangement of the acting CEO and the 
arrangements for the pursuit to discover a changeless substitution. 
In delegating an acting CEO, the board may need to consider 
whether it wants to choose somebody who won’t be a possibility 
for the changeless part.
3. RESEARCH METHODS
This paper focused on the listed firms in Nigeria because 
whatever affects these firms has a spiral effect on the economy. 
In addition, investors and other stakeholders must be carried 
along and be abreast of any changes that might want to take 
place in the organization in order to protect their investment 
interests. Therefore, the population of this study consists of all 
the companies listed on the NSE. There are 193 companies listed 
on the NSE. The sample size consists of all companies listed 
on the NSE that experienced CEO succession between 2009 
and 2013. The breakdown of the sectors are: Agriculture (5), 
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Conglomerates (6), Construction/real estate (10), Consumer 
goods (28), Financial services (58), Health care (11), ICT (10), 
Industrial goods (24), Natural resources (5), Oil and gas (14), 
Services (22). However after omitting companies with 
incomplete financial statements, companies that experienced 
CEO succession more than once, 11 CEO succession events were 
realized. A match paired t-test was used to carry out examination 
on the differences in mean and median of firm performance 
before and after CEO successions.
3.1. Model Specification
In order to examine the relationship between CEO Succession and 
firms financial performance, a linear regression model equation 
was used. The two constructs involved includes CEO succession 
and firms financial performance. The regression equation can be 
computed as
Y = β
0
+βX1+µit (1)
Explicitly, equation 1 can be defined as;
Firms financial performance = f (CEO Succession) + C (2)
In a regression form, the model specification becomes:
ROE = β
0
+β1FTO+β2VTO+β3INSDR+β4OUTSDR (3)
ROCE = β
0
+β1FTO+β2VTO+β3INSDR+β4OUTSDR (4)
TOBIN’S Q = β
0
+β1FTO+β2VTO+β3INSDR+β4OUTSDR (5)
ROA = β
0
+β1FTO+β2VTO+β3INSDR+β4OUSTDR (6)
Where:
ROE = The amount of net income returned as a percentage of 
shareholders equity.
ROCE = A financial ratio that measures a company’s profitability 
and the efficiency with which its capital is employed.
Tobin’s Q = A ratio that measures the combined market value of all 
the companies on the stock market to their replacement costs.
ROA = An indicator of how profitable a company is relative to 
its total assets.
FTO = Forced turnover (that is 1 If the CEO was replaced 
forcefully and 0 otherwise).
VTO = Voluntary turnover (if the CEO was voluntarily succeeded).
INSDR = Insider (that is 1 if the successor is from within the firm 
and 0 otherwise).
OUTSDR = Outsider (if the successor is outside the firm).
µ = Error term, which captures other explanatory variables not 
explicitly included in the model.
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
OF RESULT
This section of the study looked at the analyses of results and 
presentations. The hypothesis stated was tested and analysed using 
descriptive statistics and paired sample t-test.
The Table 1 shows the result of the descriptive statistics with 
return on assets (ROA) having the highest mean and the Tobin’s 
Q having the lowest. It also captures the mean for successor origin 
and turnover types.
In the Table 2, it could be deduced using FTO (Forced CEO 
Turnover), as the explanatory variables and ROA; return on equity 
(ROE); return on capital employed (ROCE) and Tobin’s Q as 
the dependable variable, showed that there is a mean difference 
between the pre and post succession result. For example, while 
the pre mean for ROA shows 0.002 that of the post mean shows 
−0.003. Also while the pre mean using ROE shows 0.020, the post 
mean reveals −0.739. Furthermore, the pre mean ROCE was 0.021 
and post mean was −0.006. Also, while the Tobin’s Q pre mean 
displayed 0.011, the post mean result showed 0.008. The results 
were all significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
The implication of these results is that, the impact and the effect of 
Forced CEO Turnover on ROA, ROE, ROCE and Tobin’s Q in a 
post-performance of a firm is negative. This means, when a CEO 
is forced out of the system, there is likelihood of uncertainties that 
make the stakeholder begin to re-consider their investments plan. 
In the same light, the system might not have prepared the incoming 
CEO adequately for the job at least in the first few months. This 
position lends credence to the vicious cycle theory which describes 
a negative relationship between senior leader succession and 
subsequent organizational performance. The negative relationship 
exists because the departure of a senior leader is believed to cause 
disruption to a struggling organization. The disruption leads to 
poorer performance, leading to removal of another senior leader, 
thus repeating the vicious cycle. FTOs are usually as a result of 
poor pre-succession performances and past performance has a 
significant and adverse consequence on shareholders reaction. It 
is therefore asserted that a forced CEO turnover negatively affect 
the post-succession financial performance of firms in Nigeria.
In terms of VTO (Voluntary CEO Turnover), the mean ROA is 
0.008 and in the post succession era, the mean ROA is −0.000. 
By using ROE as a measure of performance, the result shows 
that the mean ROE increases in the post succession phase. In 
the pre succession phase, the mean ROE is 0.072 and in the post 
succession era, the mean ROE is 0.114. More so, as regard to 
ROCE as a measure of performance, the result shows that the 
mean increases in the post succession phase. In the pre succession 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all the sampled 
companies
Variable OBS Mean±SD MIN MAX
ROA 53 0.0051679±0.0953164 −0.4416 0.1944
ROE 53 −0.1384509±20.040752 −14.6606 0.8995
ROCE 53 0.1559321±0.3515831 −0.3373 2.402
Tobin’s Q 53 0.0289041±0.0342433 0 0.160626
Successor 
origin
53 0.8113208±0.3949977 0 1
Turnover 
type
53 0.3584906±0.4841463 0 1
Researcher’s survey, ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, ROCE: Return on 
capital employed, SD: Standard deviation
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phase, the mean ROCE is 0.070 and in the post succession era, 
while post the mean showed 164. Also, the Tobin’s Q result showed 
that the pre mean stood at 0.016 while in the post succession era, 
the mean increased to 0.018. All the results are valid at 1%; 5% 
and 10% level of significance.
The implication of these results could be that since the 
outgoing CEO already know that it would be leaving makes it 
incumbent on it to start preparing its successors and exposing 
it to the rudiments of the business. The CEO might want to 
live a landmark by priding itself a successful person when the 
incoming CEO takes the firm to the next level. This assertion 
lend credence to the common sense theory notion popularised 
by Guest (1962); Ishak et al. (2013) which suggests that new 
leaders can cause positive changes in organizations and which 
would result in the post-succession performance especially when 
an ineffective CEO is replaced. A VTO is usually planned and 
since it is planned, the successors have already been trained 
within the firm and such planned retirements represent smooth 
transitions.
In terms of insider successor, the table demonstrated that, using 
INSIDR (insider succession), as the explanatory variables and 
ROA; ROE; ROCE and Tobin’s Q as the dependable variable, 
there is a mean difference between the pre and post succession 
result. While the pre mean using ROA showed 0.17, the post mean 
was 0.012. The result of the ROE as a dependent variable showed 
the pre mean to be 0.05 while the post mean was −0.27. Using 
ROCE, the pre mean stood at 0.060 while the post mean showed 
0.049. In the same vein, using the Tobin’s Q, the pre mean was 
0.013 while the post mean was reduced to 0.012.
The implication of the result is that, inside successors are usually 
relaxed since they have always been part of the system and some 
of the decisions that previous CEO took. The required changes 
necessary to boost the firm’s performance may be lacking. The 
above results have been supported by prior researchers who argued 
that inside successors are slow in recognising how urgent the 
current challenges are and pursue old strategies that no longer have 
proper effects. Lauterbach (1999) posited that an inside selection 
deteriorates post succession performance.
In terms of OUTSDR (CEO outside successor), the mean ROA 
stood at −0.04 while the post mean was −0.06. For ROE, the pre 
mean was 0.051 and the post mean 0.150. In the pre succession 
phase using ROCE, the mean was 0.026 while the post mean was 
0.333. Lastly, the pre mean for Tobin’s Q was 0.018 while the 
post mean was 0.020.
The increase in performance after CEO succession using Tobin’s Q 
as a measure has been supported by several researchers. According 
to Ishak et al. (2013), the stock market reacts more positively if 
the new CEO is an outsider and comes from an industry related to 
the firms’ operations. In supporting this position, Karaevli (2007) 
also posited that external CEOs enhance the performance of 
underperforming firms. This is so because it is assumed that outside 
CEOs bring new ideas and strategies to the table and take more 
drastic actions to achieve success. For an outsider to be chosen as 
a CEO, the candidate must have been seen to have an outstanding 
track record that is superior to other outside or inside candidates. 
According to the outsider succession theory, the outside successor 
is more prone to produce new thoughts and convictions into the 
association. This expands the different qualities of deduction and 
thoughts at the top level of the association, considering more 
prominent choice making self-governance to the successor.
5. CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The core objective of this research is to examine how CEO 
succession affects the subsequent financial performance of 
Nigerian listed firms. From the table above, it was clearly 
demonstrated that only the CEO VTO and Outside CEO 
Successor improve the performance of firms. However, it was 
demonstrated in the contrary that insider CEO successor and 
CEO FTO impact negatively on the financial performance of 
the firms (considering all the financial performance indicators 
considered) especially in Nigeria. This implies that a well-
structured CEO succession plan which ought to serve as an aid 
to a smooth CEO transition is lacking among Nigerian listed 
companies. The grooming process of apparent successors should 
be an act that should start even before the need arises. Training 
of apparent successors should begin early rather than wait until 
the CEO position is vacant.
In addition, Nigerian firms should carry out their activities having 
in mind those emergency situations in which the CEO may be 
forced to vacate the position due to poor performance be nip in the 
bud. The position of the CEO is so sensitive that investors want to 
know who calls the shot in an organization. The CEO determines 
the directions and coordinates strategic investment decisions that 
could either make or destroy the system hence, the reaction of 
the market. The CEO successor should be a person with capacity 
to drive the system and the people at work. The leadership style 
must command the attention of all and sundry within and outside 
the system.
Table 2: Results of the paired sample t-test
Variables ROA ROE ROCE Tobin’s Q
Pre Post Significant Pre Post Significant Pre Post Significant Pre Post Significant
FTO 0.002 −0.003 0.000*** 0.020 −0.739 0.000*** 0.021 −0.006 1.00* 0.011 0.008 0.000***
VTO 0.008 −0.000 0.000*** 0.072 0.114 0.000*** 0.070 0.164 0.000*** 0.016 0.018 1.00*
INSIDR 0.017 0.012 1.00* 0.05 −0.27 0.000*** 0.060 0.049 0.000*** 0.013 0.012 0.000***
OUTSDR −0.04 −0.06 0.000*** 0.051 0.150 1.00* 0.026 0.333 1.00* 0.018 0.020 0.000***
Researchers’ computation, Significant level at 1%*** and 10%* respectively, ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, ROCE: Return on capital employed, FTO: Forced turnover, 
VTO: Voluntary turnover
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As a result of the above, it is therefore recommends that, the board 
of directors recognize key roles that require a well-structured 
succession plan. This would involve, identifying the organizational 
positions that would require a structured succession plan. It is very 
important for a well-structure plan to aid the smooth transition 
into the new CEO’s tenure. Also, there should be a formal 
documentation of every detailed plan to ensure easy referencing. 
Included in this documentation should be any form of adjustment 
that might occur along the planning and execution process.
In addition, the apparent successors should be assessed based 
on the proficiencies needed to achieve high financial and 
organizational performance. Lastly, the capabilities and profile 
necessary to undertake the role of the CEO should be properly 
defined. It should include a narrative explanation of the required 
skill, competencies, attitudes, knowledge and other important 
abilities required for a standard performance.
The benefits inherent in this research work are vast and this can be 
carefully considered in the findings and most importantly, when 
the issue of CEO succession/leadership to the success of any 
firm is taken into consideration. However, just like other studies, 
there are limitations that make it imperative to draw inference 
with caution. These limitations are considered as opportunities 
for further studies. First, the research was centred on identifying 
the impact CEO succession on the subsequent performance of 
listed firms in Nigeria, further studies, researches can be carried 
out on Nigerian Universities and even government parastatals. 
Secondly, the research focused on the impact of CEO succession 
on the financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria. Further 
researches can look at the impact of CEO succession on the market 
performance of listed firms. The scope could also be widened to 
include other countries in Africa.
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